L I K E S M E D S L U N D , I
want to argue for a pragmatic basis for judging theories in health psychology but as will become apparent, my understanding of what is pragmatic is a considerable distance from his. The comments that follow will have a destructive and a constructive part. I want to argue that an important distinction that Smedslund wants to make in preparation for his logical analysis of theories in health psychology is fundamentally flawed. On the other hand, however, I want to rescue the profound insight that is at the root of his analysis, one that perhaps does not need or is not based on (psycho-)logic but which is important nonetheless.
My disagreement with Smedslund's analysis is quite simply a complaint that is not original to me but standard fare in philosophical discussions of empirical versus a priori distinctions. Although this distinction has a venerable history, going back to Kant's attempt to show that there is a synthetic a priori, it has been contested for almost 50 years. Most famously, Quine (1953) , in his essay on the 'two dogmas of empiricism', argued that the distinction first, could only be defined in a circular manner and second, was dependent on the verificationist theory of meaning. According to this theory statements are meaningful only if they can be known on the basis of experience or if they are grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact. Quine argued that we do not take our statements one at a time but rather 'the field as a whole' and hence the distinction between a priori statements and empirical statements is at best misleading. We may make adjustments to our system anywhere from periphery to center and any statement is capable of revision. He argued, 'taken collectively, science has its double dependence upon language and experience; but this duality is not significantly traceable into the statements of science taken one by one' (Quine, 1953, p. 42) . On these grounds he rejected the distinction of statements being either factual or a priori as a 'dogma of empiricism', and 'nonsense'.
Although a vigorous defense was mounted to this critique (by, for example, Grice and Strawson), most philosophers of science no longer view the distinction as useful or particularly germane to the workings of science. Indeed, philosophers of science as diverse as Lakatos, Popper, and Kuhn agreed that strongly held theoretical positions are not easily refuted in scientific practice and are often held in concert with empirical refutations (cf. Dupré, 1993) . If the distinction does not hold, then perhaps we might argue that Psycho-Logic is useful in some other way but that it does not provide us with a clear distinction between empirical and pseudoempirical formulations.
In what other way then could Psycho-Logic be of importance to psychology? Given that the system proposed by both Jan and Geir Smedslund is an axiomatic one, they are working on a foundational structure for all of psychology. On this conception, an axiomatic method typically concerns a formal theory that is derived from a set of primitive terms and axioms or initial assumptions. Rules of inference indicating how the theorems are to be proved are typically part of the system and by citing the classic work of Blanché I take it that Smedslund is, in the long run, after the kind of system that shows consistency, completeness, and so on. In addition, the axioms must in some sense be of the sort that are incapable of proof, that is, of the sort that Aristotle called the 'primary premise' (e.g. Chisholm, 1977) . But if we accept the argument that the distinction between a priori and empirical propositions is, at the least, problematic, then what kind of system can we say Psycho-Logic is? Using modal distinctions, Smedslund argues that even though the axioms of Psycho-Logic are a priori, they are nevertheless not demonstrable as 'necessarily true' but are merely 'consensually self-evident'. On this ground it is not clear what kind of axiomatic system Smedslund wishes us to take Psycho-Logic to be, since consensually self-evident axioms are so just by virtue of a common understanding of the use of terms in the English language, and this use relies implicitly on contextual, not a priori, criteria.
A charitable reading of Psycho-Logic, however, would simply take it to be a preliminary axiomatic system, the calculus of which ought to be carefully distinguished from its interpretation. On these grounds we can agree that the system requires further elucidation but is incomplete as it stands. Indeed, the relations between the primitives, axioms, definitions, and corollaries bear as yet no known relationship to empirical or experiential data. Leaving aside for the moment that this charitable reading continues the problematic a priori/empirical distinction, it is clear from Smedslund's own account that he does not favor this more limited reading but sees a much stronger role for the theory in practice. In this sense there is already a broad or strong version of Psycho-Logic at work, as shown in the claim that Psycho-Logic can be used in clinical work (pp. 146-147), or in the example in Figure 3 . One of the relations in this figure, 'fear of E' and 'perceived control over E' ('if P believes that he or she has total control over E, then P cannot be afraid of E') is taken to be true and a priori. This follows from an axiom and definition which together claim that 'fear' entails a belief of harm and 'control' means making or not making something occur. Fear, however, is not a logical term: it is a human feeling term. In addition, it has changed in meaning over the past 500 or so years, and it currently has more than one meaning (as a quick perusal of a dictionary would allow). When we use the word we know which of the many possible senses of fear is meant from the context (whether it refers to the feeling of fear, to the regard of something with fear, to the sense of awe that inspires fear, to apprehension, and so on) and its association with a notion of 'control' is entirely derivative of 20th-century psychology (Stam, 1987) . Its insertion into a theory as an 'a priori' is arbitrary and reflects the tastes and habits of the researcher more than it reflects any undiluted fixture of the English language.
The same can be said for the example of helplessness and depression on page 140 wherein depression and helplessness are seen as a priori. Notwithstanding the great flexibility with which the concept of depression is used in our culture, or the recent introduction of the notion of helplessness to this concept, it seems equally arbitrary to decree that depression and helplessness are somehow linked in an a priori fashion. A final example from Smedslund's article comes from the section on the model of health action. The definition of action as 'subjective and intentional' and behavior as 'objective and causational' is fraught with conceptual muddles. Indeed, any use of the terms behavior and action requires a theory of behavior and action and in the absence of such their definition is either left to the context of use or arbitrary. Although Smedslund recognizes this in part by noting that behavior 'like other observables' is theory-laden, he doesn't seem to grasp the full implications of this for Psycho-Logic. For behavior is not observable until we give it some theoretical frame. After all, stock markets behave, amoebae behave, armies behave and people behave. The term is empty of psychological meaning save its contextual sense. To take action or behavior as any kind of primitives requires substantial theorizing and is in no obvious way 'a priori'. It seems to me that I can multiply the examples from Smedslund's article but the point is clear enough.
Smedslund wishes us to take Psycho-Logic as a true axiomatic system, namely one that has the force of necessity. In addition, Smedslund applies the system to psychological theory as well as psychological problems prior to demonstrating that it has all the features of an axiomatic system. In other words, it does not have the force of necessity with which one typically refutes skepticism about a priori knowledge, namely that there is no further authority to which one can appeal. Psycho-Logic suffers from what 19th-century critics called 'psychologism', and the leading quote to this article by Lipps exemplifies this approach nicely. Psychologism was the claim that the truths of logic were evidence of how people think, and in this way they are either demonstrations of our psychological constitution or they simply are the rules of thought. The axiomatic nature of Psycho-Logic is premised on our intuitions that the axioms and definitions are held to be true by their 'consensually self-evident' nature. But as Husserl (1900 Husserl ( /1970 argued, logical laws cannot be based on psychological laws since the latter are vague and approximate and based on induction. If the Smedslunds intend their Psycho-Logic to be psychological, as I read them to, then I think they are engaged in a form of theory building that implies representations of possible psychological relationships and not the necessary relationships that are the substance of logic. I see no other way to read this article or the recent restatement of Psycho-Logic by Jan Smedslund (1997) wherein he claims that 'the system is supposed to function as a calculus by means of which psychological processes can be explained, predicted, and controlled' (p. xii). Yet the calculus is made up of statements that are descriptions of psychological processes. Hence the calculus is not independent of the interpretation and so the system is circular (but not a priori).
Having been entirely critical thus far, I believe there is a place for a related analysis and I wish to rescue the profound intuition underlying the system of Psycho-Logic from the muddles in which it has found itself. I think that the problems with which both Jan and Geir Smedslund are currently preoccupied are deeply symptomatic of the kind of psychology that is practiced in health psychology as well as many domains of human psychology.
In order for theories of health psychology to be useful to the practitioners in the health field, be they psychologists or other health professionals, the models, language, and concepts of the theories must be understandable to a broad range of professionals. Hence the level of complexity is already limited by virtue of the necessary range of application. Indeed the history of clinical psychology shows us multiple examples of this phenomenon and historically this has also been characteristic of research in other applied domains of psychology (see Danziger, 1990) . But there is a second, opposing tension at work here and Danziger noted this in his historical work as well: practitioners cannot have so simple a theory that the client doubts the technical and special expertise of the practitioner. Hence the practitioner is to some degree dependent on theories of sufficient complexity to maintain his or her specialized, esoteric knowledge at a level above that of the simply commonsensical. There is, on this view, a mutual dependence on theories derived from laboratory contexts and practice contexts that is rarely acknowledged. For this reason I think that theories in clinical and health psychology are frequently no more than seeming restatements of common sense. The Health Belief Model or the Theory of Planned Behavior trade on our understanding of a few key terms that have no meaning outside of their commonsensical use. For example notions such as the 'perceived threat of disease', 'self-efficacy' or 'intention to act' are taken out of ordinary language and given a functional role in a 'model'. Through formalization as functions any observations brought to bear on the model (or using the variables defined by the model) do not provide evidence for the model! This is true by definition-once functionalized, terms such as 'intention to act' are defined within the model and require no further evidence for their existence. Their correspondence with meanings in a natural language guarantees that they will always be 'found' in practice. Hence the commonsensical nature of theories in the applied-human domains of psychology. But this seeming commonsensical nature of these theories is, in my view, not due to their presumed reliance on a logic of common sense (or Psycho-Logic). This keeps us locked in a logical-empiricist world of a priori and empirical statements. Instead, the common-sense framework is the combined effect of the requirements of an applied psychological theory, namely comprehension by those who will be the recipients (or clients) of those who apply the theory, and the use of a functional terminology that is itself tied to research methods of a logical-empiricist variety. Despite my objections to the formalizations of Psycho-Logic, I hope I have encouraged Geir Smedslund to continue to explore the relationship between theories of health and illness and our common-sense understandings of them. It seems that this is the most pragmatic manner in which one might proceed to undermine the many massive enterprises in data gathering that, as theory-building exercises, have very little utility for either psychology or those whom psychology presumably serves.
